Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the Czech Republic is common and fl exible and is generally viewed as a means to reduce problems related to the highly fragmented local government structure. Th e paper utilizes fi nancial and accounting data of public entities to evaluate the character and magnitude of inter-municipal cooperation in the Czech Republic. It concludes that the extent of public services provided based on the service contracts or through institutionalized forms of IMC is quite limited and that the majority of the IMC is somewhat informal and soft , e.g. exchange of experience and ad-hoc projects.
Introduction
Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the Czech Republic is common and fl exible (Lewis and Fall 2017, 25) , which is not surprising as there are 6,254 municipalities with a median size of 430 inhabitants and an average size of 1,692 inhabitants (Czech Statistical Offi ce 2018). IMC is a way how to deal with pressures on local government resulting from increasing technical scale of production, growing scale of social and economic processes and pressures of the market (Hulst and van Montfort 2007) . It may be an alternative to compulsory, tow-down territorial amalgamation (Hertzog 2010 and Obec a fi nance 2016) or a tool to increase administrative capacity of small municipalities (Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic 2018a). Successful IMC generates collective benefi ts by producing effi ciencies and economies of scale in provision and production of services and by internalizing spillover problems (Feiock 2007 ).
Inter-municipal cooperation takes many diff erent forms, ranging from informal and voluntary to institutionalized and mandated. Th e full variability and extent of IMC in the Czech Republic are not fully researched yet. Th e existing research relies mostly on surveys and single or multiple case studies and favors one form of IMC, namely the voluntary associations of municipalities (VAM) (e.g. Vajdová et al. 2006 , Jetmar et al. 2015 or Ježek et al. 2015 .
Th e paper aims to explore the forms of inter-municipal cooperation in the Czech Republic and to evaluate its role in the provision of public services and joint investment. It utilizes the data on public fi nances, i.e. information available in the accounting records of the involved municipalities and voluntary associations of municipalities.
Th e fi rst part of the paper presents the various forms of IMC in the Czech Republic using the taxonomy of collaborative institutions proposed by Dowding and Feiock (2012) . Th e second section describes the data and methods utilized. Th e third part presents the results, and the fi nal part discusses the results and their implications.
Modes of inter-municipal cooperation
Decentralization brings governments closer to the people with the aim to improve allocative effi ciency and increase accountability (Lockwood 2005) . Unfortunately, the existing structure of local governments oft en fails to internalize tax and expenditure externalities and to exploit economies of scale (Oates 1999) . Small local governments may also lack the executive capacity for eff ective management of public services or exercise of regulatory duties (Davey 2004) .
Th ese problems can be solved or limited by a variety of collaborative mechanisms which involve diff erent levels of negotiations and ease of exit (Dowding and Feiock 2012) . Figure 1 presents their taxonomy of collaborative arrangements, which result either from the initiative of higher-level government, when its decisions bind all the actors (upper row) or from voluntary choices of two or more local governments, which decide on the rules themselves (bottom row).
Th e horizontal dimension captures the nature of the coordination mechanism (collective centralized and negotiated). Forms on the left rely on the resources and authority of other governments. In the middle, municipalities voluntarily enter into organizations or contracts that bind them but depend on mutual consent. To the right side, the relationships are informal. Source: Dowding and Feiock (2012, 41), adjusted In the Czech context, IMC is generally understood as voluntary (middle and right column) and negotiated (bottom line), i.e. fi elds D and F in Figure 1 . Close scrutiny, however, reveals that all types of collaborative arrangements are present there to some extent and that mandated networks and agreements (fi eld B) play a more prominent role in providing public services than interlocal agreements and service contracts (fi eld D).
Czech municipalities exercise two types of competences at the same time: independent competencies (self-government) and delegated powers (public administration). In the execution of the independent competencies, municipalities enjoy a high degree of autonomy. For delegated powers, the municipalities are in a legal sense the executors of central government policy and have limited autonomy (Hemmings 2006) . While the Law on Municipalities (128 / 2000 Coll.) states that municipalities can cooperate in case of independent competencies, cooperation, as understood by Dowding and Feiock (2012) , takes place in both types of competences.
Cooperation among municipalities in the area of delegated power takes two forms: First, bigger municipalities provide some of the administrative services for a specifi ed catchment area which covers other municipalities, as well. Th ere are seven diff erent categories of municipalities according to the extent of delegated power they exercise. Th e most important are the 207 so-called municipalities with extended power. Th e range of services and the catchment area are defi ned by the central government, which also contributes to the fi nancing of these services through grants. Th is type of cooperation fi ts under the mandated networks (fi eld B).
In the area of delegated powers municipalities can cooperate through public contracts when one municipality provides some of the administrative services for an-other one. Th ese contracts are common in the area of off enses or child protective services. Th is type of cooperation is voluntary and fi ts under service contracts (fi eld D).
In the case of IMC in the area of own competencies, the Law on Municipalities clearly prefers the form of voluntary association of municipalities (VAM) as it does not specify any other form of IMC (Jetmar et al. 2015) . Despite this, three primary forms of IMC are possible: (1) contracts, (2) formation of a voluntary association of municipalities, and (3) foundation of another type of legal person based on the appropriate legislation. All of these forms of cooperation fall under interlocal agreements and service contracts (fi eld D).
Currently 185 local action groups (LAG) operate in the Czech Republic, created and funded in the framework of EU program LEADER (Vrabková and Šaradín 2017) . Th e Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic is a strong advocate of IMC in the Czech Republic. In the framework of a project funded by the EU funds 83 involved VAM operate so-called Centers of joint services which aim to increase the administrative capacity of municipalities (Union of Towns and Municipalities of the Czech Republic 2018b). According to Dowding and Feiock's (2012) taxonomy both LAG and Centers of joint services stay on the border between the regional organization and interlocal agreements (fi eld C), as they strongly rely on external funding, which comes hand in hand with stringent rules.
A unique form of cooperation takes place in the case of preschool and elementary education. Municipalities which do not operate own schools guarantee the availability of education through contracts with other municipalities. Municipalities compensated each other for the provision of education until 2012 (Figure 2 ). Since 2013 education is fi nanced through the shared taxes when municipalities which operate a school receive a higher share based on the number of enrolled pupils. Th is arrangement incorporates voluntariness and central government funding again (fi eld C).
Informal cooperation (fi eld F) is extremely popular. It includes the exchange of information and experience using informal networks, such as working groups or meetings of mayors. 30 % of mayors surveyed by Jetmar et al. (2015) deemed it the most suitable form of IMC, and more than half of the offi cials surveyed by Ježek et al. (2015) prefer this form of IMC.
Hulst and van Montfort (2011) add one more dimension to classify inter-municipal cooperation: the tasks involved in cooperation. Th ey distinguish between service delivery, i.e. joint production, and policy coordination and planning. A prerequisite for the provision and production of many public services is the existence of particular infrastructures, such as a drinking water and sewer network or a school building. IMC can be particularly useful when building such an infrastructure.
Our analysis of the IMC in the Czech Republic is based on the fact that both the provision of services and building necessary infrastructure incurs costs, and these costs, together with the revenues which fi nance them, must be recorded in the accounting books of either the municipalities or the jointly created organizations. Th is allows us to track cooperation in service delivery and joint investment in the form of interlocal agreements and service contracts (fi eld D). Policy coordination and planning and any type of informal cooperation, on the other hand, is very hard to track in accounting books.
Data and methods
In our analysis, we combine a longitudinal approach (1997 -2017) with an in-depth cross-sectional analysis in 2014. Th e year 2014 was chosen as it is the only year for which the complete data on the VAM membership and population is available.
To map the IMC, we use and combine various resources:
Information on public fi nances come from the budget and accounting reports of individual municipalities and VAM provided by the Ministry of Finance (2018a) through its database Monitor. Budget reports include data on revenue and expenditure recorded using the cash principle and classifi ed using the Budget classifi cation In order to analyze the economic activity of the VAM four main indicators are used:
• Fixed assets per capita = netto fi xed assets as of 31 December 2014 divided by the sum of inhabitants in the member municipalities;
• Per capita costs from own activity = average costs from own activity in 2012 -2014 divided by the sum of inhabitants in the member municipalities;
• Per capita expenditure = average total expenditure in 2012 -2014 divided by the sum of inhabitants in the member municipalities;
• Share of own resources = diff erence between total revenues and the sum of transfers received from other subjects than municipalities divided by total revenues in 2012 -2014.
Th e data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and diff erence of the means test and visualized in MS Excel.
Results

Contracts signed for the fulfi llment of particular tasks
Municipalities can close contracts with another municipality in the case of both independent and delegated competencies. Th e related fi nancial compensation is displayed in municipal budgets as current or investment transfers to another municipality. Figure 2 shows its development over the last two decades. Th e volume of inter-municipal transfers was always low, and its share in total municipal expenditure fell further from 1 % in 1997 to 0.1 % in 2017. Th e signifi cant change since 2001 is related to the public administration reform and the introduction of a new system of tax revenue sharing. Financing preschool and elementary education through the tax revenue sharing since 2013 replaced the previous system of mutual compensations between municipaliti es.
Figure 2
Inter-municipal transfers (billions CZK) Unfortunately, we are not able to track one type of cooperation in the accounting books, namely joint out-sourcing of service delivery to private companies, as both individual and joint out-sourcing is displayed together.
Joint registered companies
Municipalities can jointly establish various types of legal entities based on the relevant legislation, such as joint stock company, limited company, limited partnership, co-partnership, cooperative, not-for-profi t organization, and foundation (Vedral et al. 2008 ).
Our analysis deals only with joint stock companies and limited companies. In total there were 292 public joint stock companies in 2014 and 658 public limited companies (Ministry of Finance 2014). Th e published list provides the name of the company and its identifi cation number, but not the public entity which is the owner of the company. Database Albertina includes data on registered companies provided by the business registry, but the data is unfortunately not complete, so that we were able to identify owners for only 75 % of public companies. Based on the available data municipalities own at least 167 joint stock companies and 541 limited companies.
Joint municipal ownership of registered companies is quite rare. Th e abovedescribed search led to the identifi cation of 1 joint stock company and 25 joint limited companies owned by at least two municipalities. Th e number of owners ranges from two to 17, and the companies operate in the area of public transportation, water, forest management and waste management.
Th is fi nding is in line with Ježek (2016) , who surveyed municipal offi cials and found out that cooperation in the form of joint registered companies is the least preferred form of inter-municipal cooperation.
Voluntary associations of municipalities
Th e voluntary association of municipalities (VAM) is a particular type of legal entity intended for inter-municipal cooperation. A VAM can be founded by two or more municipalities that need not be neighbors. One municipality can be a member of multiple VAMs. Th e VAM is established based on a contract that must be approved by the municipal councils of all participating municipalities. Its status declaration guides the activity of a VAM.
Th e VAM legally comes into being when the regional offi ce registers it, and it ends its existence based on an agreement, lapse of the designated period, or fulfi llment of the task defi ned in the founding contract. Th e fi nancial management of VAMs is regulated similarly to that of local governments: VAMs prepare and approve an annual budget which uses the Budget classifi cation (323 / 2002 Coll.), compile the regular budget reporting and accounting documents, and their management is subject to an annual audit. Unfortunately not all registered VAMs submit their fi nancial documents properly, and their data are not included in the database Monitor ( Figure 3 shows the extent of the missing documents).
Total VAM expenditure was quite volatile over the last two decades (Figure  4 ), but its share in total municipal revenues remained low (3 %) even at its peak in 2015. Th e volume and structure are strongly infl uenced by the availability of external fi nancing, for instance the EU fun ds. VAMs have three main fi nancial sources: member contributions, non-tax revenues resulting from their operations, and external resources, such as grants (Gavlasová et al. 2007, 62) . Member contributions (contributions from the member municipalities) usually include annual and entrance fees. Th e annual fee is mostly given as a per-capita amount (approved by all participating municipalities), while the entrance fee is a lump sum per municipality. Th ese fees are usually quite symbolic. In case of the realization of an investment project, contributions are oft en calculated based on the cost principle.
Th e share of external recourses available to VAM declines. Th e average share of external resources fell steadily from 35 % in 2010 to 21 % in 2017. At the same time, the share of VAM without external resources grew from 40 % in 2010 to 48 % in 2017.
Th e disaggregation of VAM expenditure gives a more detailed picture of their role and activity ( Figure 5) . Th e individual functions are based on the functional budget classifi cation, when individual paragraphs are grouped into broader categories. Th e division on current expenditure and investment follows the economic budget classifi cation. Th e number of VAM indicates the number of VAM with any expenditure in the given area; hence in some cases, the extent of their activity can be extremely limite d. Th e primary area of activity of VAMs is water and sewer management. Th e investment in this area comprises the vast majority of total VAM expenditure. Current expenditure is signifi cant, as well. Much investment in the area of waste management took place at the beginning of the century, followed by stable current expenditure needed for the operation of the existing facilities. Current expenditure in the area of transport and roads is very stable over time, and there were a few onetime signifi cant investments.
Expenditure in the remaining areas is signifi cantly lower. We can observe the growth of current expenditure in the area of housing and communal services, health care and social services and recently in the area of education. Th e number of involved VAMs is growing in these areas, as well. However, generally, the role of VAMs in these areas is minimal.
Th ese data contradict the preferences of the mayors surveyed by Jetmar et al. (2015) . About a third of them claimed that their preferred activity of VAM is waste management, social services, and education. Th ese preferences are met only in the area of waste management. Our analysis based on the fi nancial and accounting records showed that cooperation in the area of education or social services realized through VAM is sporadic.
Voluntary associations of municipalities in 2014
According to the registry of economic subjects for the whole year 2014, 731 VAMs existed. Database Monitor does not include any fi nancial and accounting reports in the case of 22 VAMs (Ministry of Finance 2018a), and the database of audit results in 2014 does not contain information about 27 VAMs (Ministry of Finance 2018b). Th ese defi ciencies raise questions regarding the real functionality of these VAMs, as they do not comply with legal obligations, and generally regarding the comprehensiveness of the fi nancial and accounting data regarding VAMs.
Th e fi nal sample of analyzed VAMs includes 615 units for which data on membership municipalities were available in Union of Towns and Municipalities (2014) . Two types of VAMs are distinguished: single-purpose VAMs (182 units) and microregions (433 units). Single-purpose VAMs are most oft en active in the area of water and sewer management or waste management. Microregions, on the other hand, realize a broader range of activities in their territories, usually with a developmental aim. Th e division is based on Union of Towns and Municipalities (2014).
Many VAMs (15 % single-purpose and 26 % microregions) did not own any long-term fi xed assets in 2014, and the average costs from own activity between 2012 and 2014 were oft en meager. Half of the microregions operated annually with less than 27 CZK (app. 1 EUR) per inhabitant. Th e median per-capita costs in single-purpose VAMs were 137 CZK (app. 5 EUR). Both fi xed assets per capita and annual per capita costs from own activity were signifi cantly higher in single-purpose VAMs, but we can fi nd extraordinarily high and low values in both types of VAM (Figure 6 ). Th e share of own resources, i.e. municipal contributions and revenues from own activity, ranges from almost zero to one. 43 % of single-purpose VAMs and 26 % of microregions operated in the period 2012 to 2014 without external resources. Th ere is no clear relationship between the share of own resources, and per capita expenditure; however, very high expenditure is always related with a high share of external resources, i.e. grants (Figure 7 ). Th e analysis of chosen fi nancial indicators showed enormous heterogeneity among the existing VAMs. Almost a third of VAMs operate without external funding, and another third rely more on own than external funding. On the other hand, the volume of their expenditure or costs of own activity is oft en so low that it questions its real impact beyond the informal exchange of experience.
Discussion
From the point of view of a single municipality, IMC is one of the possible ways how to provide public services (Bel and Warner 2016) . Our analysis, based on fi nancial and accounting information provided by public entities, confi rmed that interlocal agreements in service delivery and building infrastructure is less signifi cant than expected, based on opinions of local offi cials (e.g. Ježek et al. 2015 or Jetmar et al. 2015 . However, is it really a surprising result ?
Small-scale local government and sizeable local policy domain are likely to result in intense IMC in service delivery (Hulst and van Montfort 2011) . While Czech municipalities comply with the small-scale requirement, they have a relatively small policy domain. Municipalities have quite a limited number of public services they lawfully must provide (e.g. waste management, elementary education, basic administrative services). Regarding many public services (e.g. social services or leisure activities) they are free to take up new tasks and services, but small municipalities rarely do (Sedmihradská and Kábelová 2018) . Reforms of the tax sharing formulas favoring small municipalities since 2008 and providing funding of elementary education since 2013 soft ened the budget constraint of mostly small municipalities and further limited the already weak pressure to search for more effi cient forms of public service provision.
Functional areas of IMC, when the VAMs are most active in the areas of water and sewer management and waste management, comply with the expectation that municipalities are inclined to collaborate in services which require substantial fi nancial investment and off er substantial effi ciencies of scale (Hulst and van Montfort 2011) .
Th e dominance of the VAMs compared to service agreements is entirely in line with the experience in other European countries: if the legal requirements to found an organization are not prohibitive and if there are (potential) fi nancial incentives from central government, "informal or contract like forms of co-operation are replaced by co-operation through service organizations" (Hulst and van Montfort 2011, 135) . Current legislation only mentioning VAM as a form of IMC clearly expresses the intents of the central government.
Conclusions
Financial and accounting information about public entities is a rich source of information about their activity. Th is paper utilized this data source to explore the extent and character of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the Czech Republic and presents new fi ndings which complement the existing research based predominantly on public offi cials' surveys.
Czech municipalities cooperate to a great extent, and we can fi nd numerous examples of very successful IMC either in the form of VAM or others.
Th e key form of IMC are without any doubt voluntary associations of municipalities (VAM), as also suggested by Jetmar et al. (2015) and Ježek et al. (2015) . Th e magnitude of the cooperation is hugely varied across functional areas and individual VAMs. Th e most widespread is cooperation in the area of waste management (300 VAMs), with a current annual expenditure above 150 million CZK. Th e highest share of expenditure, both current and capital, is dedicated to water and sewer management (26 % of current expenditure and 79 % of capital expenditure over the period 1997 -2017) . Surprisingly, the signifi cant impact of IMC in this area is not indeed refl ected in the above-cited research, and unlike cooperation in the area waste management (e.g. Soukopová and Klimovský 2016) is not a subject of academic research, either. VAMs play only a minimal role in the case of education (23 VAMs) and healthcare and social services (17 VAMs), which is quite contrary to the fi ndings of both Ježek (2016) and Jetmar et al. (2015) , who found out that municipalities want to cooperate in these areas and do.
Municipalities oft en cooperate based on mutual contracts, but the resulting fi nancial compensations are extremely low (less than 0.1 % of total municipal expenditure in 2017). Th is suggests that municipalities rely less on purely voluntary cooperation and more on mandated networks or agreements when the provider of the service is not compensated by the receiver of the service but by a higher level of government through another mechanism, e.g. grants or tax sharing. At the same time, it is likely that much cooperation has a more informal and soft character than the joint provision of services or joint investment.
Our fi ndings thus suggest that a signifi cant share of IMC takes the form of mandated networks and agreements (fi eld B in Figure 1 ) rather than interlocal agreements and service contracts (fi eld D in Figure 1 ). Hence IMC may oft en be a result of higher-level government stimuli and fi nancial support rather than bottomup voluntary initiative (see also Swianiewicz 2010) .
Th ese fi ndings are important in the current debate about the capacity of IMC and VAM in particular to solve (some) problems of the fragmented municipal structure and of the many small municipalities (Obec a fi nance 2016). Czech municipalities strongly oppose any changes in the mandated networks but at the same time call for higher fi nancial support of voluntary IMC. So far the central government plays along -municipal amalgamation is an absolute taboo in political discussion, and sizable projects supporting IMC are funded. Th eir real impact needs yet to be evaluated.
